Artificial Intelligence and the Future of Jobs: Greater Wealth or Wider Unemployment? What Awaits Palestine?

Artificial Intelligence and the Future of Jobs: Greater Wealth or Wider Unemployment? And What Awaits Palestine?

Introduction: a Young Man’s Question Opens a Major Economic Issue

A young man who has been searching for work for a long time asked me—like thousands of graduates from universities and institutes in Palestine: what is the future of jobs in light of the rapid spread of artificial intelligence? Will it create new employment opportunities or lead to wider unemployment? And can our Palestinian economy, under its exceptional conditions, benefit from this technological revolution?

These questions prompted me to review reports from the World Bank, the International Labour Organization, the World Economic Forum, and studies on the future of work and digital transformation. The aim is not only to foresee the future, but to provide some answers that help our youth choose their majors, guide parents for their children, motivate universities to update their programs, and push government institutions and the private sector to prepare for transformations that may reshape the economy and the labor market.

Artificial intelligence is no longer merely a technical development; it has become an influential factor in productivity, investment, and the distribution of income and wealth, and in the relationship between capital and labor. The more important question is not only what machines can do instead of humans, but how the gains from technology can be converted into new jobs and broader economic opportunities, rather than concentrating wealth and deepening social inequality.

First: Will Artificial Intelligence Create More Jobs Than It Eliminates?

The World Economic Forum’s “The Future of Jobs 2025” report provides an important estimate of the expected transformations through 2030. According to employers’ projections, about 170 million jobs are expected to be created globally, compared with about 92 million jobs displaced, i.e., a projected net increase of 78 million jobs.

But these figures include the effects of technology, demographic shifts, the green transition, and other economic changes, and do not represent the impact of artificial intelligence alone. They are also projections, not guarantees, and do not mean that a worker who loses a job will automatically find a replacement job.

Total global employment may grow while specific occupations, sectors, and countries suffer. New jobs may require different skills or offer wages and working conditions that do not necessarily compensate those who lost work in declining occupations.

A problem deserving special attention emerges here: the potential decline in entry-level opportunities into the labor market. If institutions can use artificial intelligence to perform some of the elementary tasks that new graduates used to undertake, they may have less need to employ them, and acquiring the practical experience necessary to move into higher-level jobs may become more difficult. This is not an inevitable outcome in all sectors, but it is a highly significant possibility in Palestine, where graduates already struggle to find suitable employment.

Second: Will Machines Replace Workers or Change the Nature of Their Jobs?

The ILO study “Generative AI and Jobs: 2025 Update” makes an important distinction between a job’s exposure to technological impact and its complete disappearance. Estimates indicate that about one in four jobs worldwide is exposed to generative AI to some degree, but changing the nature of most jobs seems more likely than completely dispensing with the workers in those jobs.

The reason is that a single occupation consists of multiple tasks; technology may perform some of these tasks while other tasks still require human judgment, communication, experience, and professional responsibility.

Nevertheless, the persistence of an occupation does not necessarily mean the preservation of the number of workers in it. If an institution can accomplish the same volume of work with fewer employees, it may reduce its workforce. Conversely, lower costs and higher productivity may lead to expansion of activity and increased demand, creating new opportunities.

Thus, the outcome depends on the speed of technology adoption, the size of demand for goods and services, investment, skills, and economic policies. The impact is not limited to office work; it extends to varying degrees to industry, services, transport, logistics, and others.

Third: The Paradox of Developing Economies and the Arab Experience

The World Bank report “World Development Report 2026: The Promise of Artificial Intelligence,” according to the figures cited in this piece, indicates that about 4.5% of existing jobs in low- and middle-income economies are exposed to the risk of automation by generative AI, compared with 14.2% in high-income economies. Conversely, about 16.2% of jobs in developing economies may see a tangible improvement in productivity thanks to this technology.

But exposure to automation is not synonymous with job loss, nor does the potential to boost productivity mean it will be realized automatically. Benefiting requires reliable digital infrastructure, adequate electricity and connectivity, human skills, financing, and institutions capable of deploying technology effectively.

Here an economic paradox appears: some developing economies may be less exposed to direct technological substitution, but they are also less prepared to capture productivity gains. Therefore, a lower risk of labor substitution is not a real advantage if it is accompanied by weak investment, production, and innovation.

The Arab region provides a clear example of varying readiness. In the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, investments and advanced digital infrastructure support the use of technology in health, education, trade, and financial services. Other Arab countries face challenges related to weak financing and infrastructure, instability, and limited private sector growth.

The ILO and ESCWA report on managing digital transformation and the AI revolution in Arab labor markets presents scenarios that illustrate potential growth and employment opportunities, alongside risks of disparity and loss of some jobs.

In one scenario, expanding broadband coverage leads to net economic gains of about 186,000 additional jobs in the region by 2035. In a scenario that combines expanded connectivity with investments in artificial intelligence, estimated gains to GDP rise to about $14.1 billion, with a projected net increase of about 118,000 jobs by 2035, after early losses caused by automation. These are possible scenario results, not definitive forecasts.

The same estimates indicate that administrative and routine jobs are more exposed to decline, while opportunities may grow in education, personal services, construction, transport, and technical and scientific occupations. Women may face greater risks in some administrative roles, which makes policies on training, retraining, and equal opportunity an essential part of managing the transition.

The conclusion is that importing AI tools alone is not enough. It is necessary to build local capacities, update education and training, support small and medium enterprises, develop labor markets, and ensure that productivity gains do not flow to limited groups at the expense of the rest of society.

Fourth: Palestine Faces an Employment Crisis That Precedes the Technological Revolution

The Palestinian situation differs from many developing economies because employment challenges do not arise from technological development alone, but from Israeli occupation constraints on movement, trade, investment, and production, from the widespread destruction of economic capacities in the Gaza Strip, as well as from the local economy’s weak ability to absorb new entrants into the labor market.

According to data from the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) cited in this piece, the unemployment rate in the West Bank was 29.5% in the first quarter of 2026, then fell to 27.9% in the second quarter. Youth graduate unemployment for holders of intermediate diplomas and higher was 38.3% in the second quarter, rising to 51.2% among females within this category. The number of employed persons in the local labor market in the West Bank declined to about 680,000.

These figures reveal a large gap between the number of job seekers and the economy’s capacity to create jobs. In this context, adopting artificial intelligence without a clear employment strategy may increase pressures on some administrative and office jobs, at a time when alternative opportunities are not necessarily available quickly enough.

The World Bank report “Palestine Economic Monitor: Monitoring Economic Conditions, May 2026” describes the labor market in Gaza Strip as virtually halted, with unemployment reaching 78% in 2025, while unemployment in the West Bank remained high. It also notes that the number of Palestinians working in Israel, which exceeded 177,000 before October 2023, has not recovered to previous levels, and that the local economy remains structurally unable to provide large-scale employment opportunities.

This crisis is inseparable from the Palestinian Authority’s fiscal situation. According to the same report, revenue disruptions and Israeli deductions from clearance revenues have contributed to widening the financing gap and increasing reliance on arrears and domestic borrowing, which limits public institutions’ ability to expand developmental and investment spending.

Therefore, artificial intelligence should not be treated as a magic solution to Palestinian employment problems. Technology alone cannot compensate for declining investment, restrictions on trade and movement, or the destruction that afflicted productive sectors.

But it may open economic pathways worth studying, particularly for small enterprises and youth able to provide services to external markets, such as accounting, financial analysis, programming, design, translation, digital marketing, research, and remote education.

However, accessing these markets requires marketable skills, reliable connectivity, adequate electricity, effective payment and collection methods, and competitive capacity. Artificial intelligence itself may also increase competition in some services and put downward pressure on their prices.

Fifth: How do we turn artificial intelligence into a tool for job creation?

Turning the technology into employment gains requires an integrated economic policy that does not stop at purchasing digital tools or organizing training courses disconnected from market needs.

First, university, technical, and vocational education should be updated and linked to the changing needs of the economy. It is not enough to teach students how to use artificial intelligence applications; analytical thinking, problem-solving, digital skills, and the ability to engage in continuous learning must be developed.

Second, small and medium enterprises should be supported with finance, advisory services, training, and market access to help them integrate technology into their operations and raise their productivity. Purchasing technical tools does not yield automatic gains if the enterprise lacks the appropriate skills and plan.

Third, investment should be directed toward activities capable of creating added value and employment opportunities, including exportable digital services, manufacturing industries, modern agriculture, renewable energy, and health and education services, based on feasibility studies and market needs.

Fourth, employment services, career guidance, retraining programs, and social protection should be developed to help workers affected by transformations transition to new occupations, with special attention to youth, women, and the most vulnerable groups.

Fifth, the results of digital transformation should be measured by actual indicators that include jobs created and lost, wages, productivity, youth and women’s participation, and local enterprises’ ability to access finance and markets, not by the number of trainees or tools purchased.

In Palestine, a national program to develop exportable digital skills could be considered, linking youth directly to clients and external markets and measuring its success by the size of income and sustainable employment opportunities it generates. This program could serve as a supporting path to expand economic activity, but it does not substitute for addressing the structural constraints that hinder Palestinian economic growth.

Conclusion: Technology does not alone determine human destiny

Will the artificial intelligence revolution reduce the gap between advanced and developing economies or deepen it? There is no single answer that applies to all countries. The outcome depends on investment in education, research and development, and infrastructure, and on the ability of states and firms to convert technology into domestic production with added value.

Countries that develop the technology and own companies, platforms, data, and knowledge are better positioned to capture its returns. Economies that only adopt the technology without developing their productive and technical capacities may find themselves consumers of technology rather than partners in producing its value.

For Palestine, the challenge is more pressing: how do we create jobs in an economy that already suffers from limited investment, low production, and high unemployment? And how do we use technology to open new markets for youth and local enterprises without ignoring the constraints that limit our growth capacity?

The answer does not lie in waiting for technology to create jobs by itself, but in integrating it within a national strategy for employment and development that links education to market needs, supports production, investment, and entrepreneurship, and expands exportable digital services.

The true measure of technological progress is not how much machines can accomplish in place of humans, but how much production, wealth, employment opportunities, and economic dignity society can achieve thanks to that technology.

1- World Economic Forum reports (The Future of Jobs Report 2025)

2- International Labour Organization reports (Generative AI and Jobs - update May 2025) + (Navigating the Digital and AI Revolution in Arab Labour Markets: Trends, Challenges and Opportunities)

3- International Monetary Fund reports

4- World Bank reports (The Palestinian Economic Update - Economic Monitor May 2026)

5- National Bureau of Economic Research 2025 NBER (Computers in Human Behavior) + (Artificial Intelligence - Opportunities and Challenges 11-2023)

6- Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) (Labour Force Survey 2026)