Pulses and Indicators of Unemployment in Palestine — Part Three
The article examines structural and political factors driving unemployment in Palestine, including Israeli control of Area C, settlement expansion, movement restrictions between the West Bank and Gaza Strip, dependence on work in Israel and the settlements, and Israel’s withholding of clearance revenues to the Palestinian National Authority.
العربيةRead the Arabic original
English translation, prepared and reviewed before publication. The Arabic text is authoritative.
- Published
- Reading time
- 8 min read

9-10-2018
· Part Three From the article.. Unemployment
- The Israeli occupation forces control the lands of the Palestinian areas classified as "C" under the Oslo Accords, which constitute more than 60% of the land of Palestine 1967; Palestinians have no authority over them or their resources; Palestinians are not permitted to establish any projects or even any buildings, or exploit the resources in their subsoil or atmosphere; this shackles the hands of the Palestinian National Authority in freedom of investment movement to confront economic hardships and prevents the establishment of any projects to create new jobs.
- The extensive and dangerous establishment of settlements, in addition to the danger that their products pose to Palestinian local production in terms of prices, quantities and quality, not to mention the smuggling of goods from these settlements into the areas of the Palestinian National Authority, results in the wasting of the clearance revenues due to taxes for the Palestinian side; add to that that some goods smuggled from Israel and the settlements are in some cases unfit for human use... and consequently the resulting health risks to the lives of Palestinian consumers, and the reduction in opportunities for planning development in the Palestinian economy... which affects creating an investment climate to confront unemployment.
- The daily checkpoints and closures by the Israeli occupation forces obstruct the flow and passage of goods and trade exchange between Palestinian cities and villages, in addition to the lack of freedom of movement and transport for individuals and goods between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and the continued siege imposed on the Gaza Strip, which by imposing this siege has created for the Palestinian National Authority large economic, political and life obstacles.
- The movement of Palestinian workers in Israel and in the Israeli settlements is subject in terms of numbers to complete Israeli control: it decides the number of work permits it issues to Palestinian workers and thereby controls the number of workers allowed to work in Israel; and on many occasions Israel cancels numbers of permitted workers due to confrontations with Palestinians angry at the occupation, applying a policy of collective punishment. Thus, despite references in the Oslo Accords and the Paris Agreement to guaranteeing freedom of movement for Palestinian workers to Israel, the Israeli side arrogantly practices whatever obstacles it wishes against the Palestinians. Therefore, work in Israel and the settlements is not stable and is governed by political events despite the high wages for Palestinian workers in Israel compared to wages paid in the Palestinian labor market; such wages contribute to stimulating the Palestinian commercial market and circulation of cash to purchase goods and services from the Palestinian market that partly revives it. However, dependence on employing Palestinian labor in the Israeli occupation is a negative point in concepts of sovereignty and the Palestinian struggle to remove the Israeli military occupation; it is a bitter choice...
- Israel often withholds the monthly transfer of Palestinian tax and customs monies — what are called clearance revenues — or disposes of these allocations by deducting what it deems to be its rights and those of its companies and citizens when it claims that there are debts owed to it by the Authority or by individual Palestinians. Palestinian government spending would be severely affected if restrictions were placed on delivering Palestinian tax monies: the inflow of funds to the Palestinian treasury would decrease and create instability in Palestinian society, since the salaries of employees in the public sector depend on the continued transfer of these revenues, which are the rights of the Palestinians. In addition, the financial deficit of the Authority would increase, which would lead to a reduction in government spending, which is fundamental to developing the Palestinian economy by expanding infrastructure to stimulate investment and create new jobs... and spending on its people in building infrastructure and social welfare programs, especially families of martyrs and prisoners, which prompted Israeli objections to stopping the transfer of the clearance revenues to the Palestinian National Authority on the pretext of supporting the families of terrorists — as they claim. This position was adopted by the United States in its policy toward the Palestinians.
- The political instability caused by the continuation of the Israeli occupation and the continued imposition of the siege on the Gaza Strip, and the absence of any solution in the foreseeable future, have led to the disappearance of prospects for settlement, closing the door on any potential investments by Palestinian businessmen in the local market in light of such obstacles and the siege. We add in this regard that the continuation of the Israeli occupation encourages Palestinian youth, in light of prevailing unemployment, to seek ways to emigrate abroad; consequently, the numbers of trained human resources shrink, which are one of the main means and elements of local production; with the departure and emigration of the country's competencies abroad, the possibilities for achieving significant economic development in Palestine narrow. Emigration of the country's sons abroad is an emigration of minds and hands that we are in dire need of...
- Events and developments that followed the publication of the unemployment rate statistics for 2017 will lead to worsening and further strangulation of the Palestinian economic situation, which could raise the unemployment rate to extremely high levels. Among these events and effects are external and internal events such as:
- The cancellation of the annual U.S. aid to the Palestinian National Authority amounting to $200 million, the cancellation of assistance programs for Palestinian youth estimated at tens of millions of dollars, in addition to the cancellation of financial aid to Palestinian hospitals, and the cancellation of U.S. contributions to the Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees — the result of which will be the dissolution of the Agency for Palestinian refugees — and consequently the cancellation of the Agency’s services to Palestinian refugees, which supervises schools across areas inside and outside that enroll approximately half a million Palestinian students, not to mention the employees who will be laid off at a time when Arab countries have not announced that they will compensate or replace the U.S. support for the Agency. Since all this withholding is primarily political to pressure the Palestinian side to accept U.S. dictates regarding the Deal of the Century, the U.S. Congress laws and what the current U.S. administration has led to added a decision by the U.S. to recognize Jerusalem as the united capital of Israel and to move the U.S. embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, and there was no effective reaction from the League of Arab States other than the statement yesterday by the League’s Secretary-General appealing to European countries to fill the financial gap for the Relief Agency resulting from the United States’ withdrawal from funding the Agency’s budget — as it is of course a principal funder. All of this added another barrier to the Palestinian economy rising to develop its society... since such a siege will burden the Palestinian National Authority in seeking funders for the Relief Agency despite the weakness of the possibility of this reliance; this will provoke the United States, and the Palestinian Authority will find itself obliged to attempt to provide services to these numbers of students through government spending it cannot afford in light of the circumstances of the Palestinian economy, and face an increase in the number of unemployed following the expected dismissal of employees and teachers at the Relief Agency, which will exacerbate the Palestinian Authority’s financial crisis that has become critical.
- In addition, donor countries’ aid has begun to decline one way or another, in addition to some conditions and reservations from some European donor countries, as happened with funds provided by the Belgian government, where they objected to naming a certain school after one of the martyrs of the homeland. Thus even in donor funds there is no stability in their flow or permanence in the sizes of their amounts. We observe the alignment of Western countries’ positions should the United States announce the cutting of aid according to pretexts it fabricates, as we see the convergence of some Western countries' positions with the United States’ but in different tones and methods, in which these countries seek the same path as the United States, but gradually. In truth they hasten to support one another quietly in such situations. Therefore, one cannot rely much on the positions of donor countries if the United States does not agree to a particular course with the Palestinian Authority... and consequently there will not be appropriate government spending to carry out projects to employ some of the unemployed due to the lack of financial resources. Wealthy Arab states have shown no intention of setting any compensatory program for this interruption that has occurred and is also expected..!..
- The lukewarm enthusiasm of some Arab countries, especially the oil-producing ones, to supply Palestinians with the grants and financial assistance required, as per the summit council decisions in the Arab League… and in the manner appropriate for support — an arrangement that falls into the category of unstable and unclear support. Consequently, the Palestinians’ fiscal and monetary planning cannot include the amounts of Arab support cited in the Arab League summit council decisions as if they were fully guaranteed..!!
- Making matters worse, the recent verbal and implemented decision by the embassies of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia prohibiting Palestinian umrah pilgrims and Hajj pilgrims who hold temporary Jordanian passports from visiting Saudi Arabia to perform the religious rites… but the matter goes beyond that restriction. It will not be limited to Palestinian Hajj and umrah pilgrims: in recent days the Saudi embassy in Amman refused to issue work visas for some Palestinian professionals, such as engineers previously contracted with certain Saudi institutions and companies, and therefore refused to stamp entry visas on Palestinian passports. This, in turn, can be interpreted in the future as a prohibition on any Palestinians holding the Palestinian passport from working in Saudi Arabia, since they refuse to stamp work visas on Palestinian passports. Note that they used previously to stamp visas only for Palestinians holding temporary Jordanian passports. In addition, there is another matter expected to occur later: the cancellation of the contracts of Palestinians who hold temporary Jordanian passports and who are currently working in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Under this scenario, when annually renewable employment contracts come up for renewal, it is likely that renewal will be refused and they will be deported to their countries, whether to Palestine or Jordan. This will exacerbate the current scourge of unemployment, since remittances from expatriates abroad to their families in Palestine were an important factor in the development of Palestinian society and in increasing local income. It is a serious crisis in light of this entire siege!! The ban may be political, to tighten the noose on the Palestinians and force them to accept the terms of the "Deal of the Century"...
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Zuhdi Shubeitah, “Pulses and Indicators of Unemployment in Palestine — Part Three” (English translation of «نبضات..ومؤشرات البطالة....في فلسطين....الجزء الثالث», originally published 20 September 2022), https://www.zuhdish.co/en/articles/pulses-and-indicators-of-unemployment-in-palestine-part
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