Memoirs of Dr. Condoleezza Rice

-        Memories from My Years in Washington.... The Highest Ranks of Honor "

-        Condoleezza Rice served as the President's National Security Advisor from 20-1-2001 until 26-1-2005, and then served as U.S. Secretary of State from 26-1-2005 until 20-1-2009.... Her memoir, which runs 849 pages under the title (Memories from My Years in Washington: The Highest Ranks of Honor), was printed in 2011, in which she addressed all the hot issues and matters in the world, chief among them the Middle East issue.... The book contained 58 chapters, and I have selected some of these chapters that relate to the Palestinian cause in general, which I will publish summaries of in parts. Condoleezza Rice, who was known as "Condi," as George Tenet, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency - CIA - in the United States during the same period of service, used to call her—Condi reached the highest levels of government during her service, and despite most U.S. administration officials' bias toward the Israeli point of view at that time, she had shown some fundamentals of U.S. foreign policy at the international level in her memoir, and she also expressed some convictions that are somewhat forbidden to express while serving in public office, such as her view recorded in the memoir that Israel occupies Palestinian lands and establishes settlements that the United States cannot legitimize.....etc. You will also find a general picture of the interrogation of our Palestinian negotiators in the negotiation sessions held in those periods, and what happened in the corridors of the multiple conferences.. in addition to the need to be familiar with and review what Palestinian-Israeli negotiations reached in stages, since one is supposed to build on them even if negotiations resume in the future, and especially the view of former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert... which, according to Condi's account, was an unprecedented breakthrough by an Israeli prime minister, and that was during the days of President George W. Bush's administration...

-        The security agenda was dominated by the Middle East crisis, that low-intensity war between the Palestinians and the Israelis, and that regional explosion actually preceded us in time: in 2000 the Clinton administration brought the two sides together at Camp David in a serious attempt to resolve the long-standing conflict that had lasted for decades. Ehud Barak, the Prime Minister, wanted an agreement and pressed for it, but the record was incomplete.. Up until that day, he appeared willing to withdraw from almost all the West Bank, Gaza, and to allow a limited number of Palestinian refugees to return to Israel and to work out a solution for Jerusalem that would somehow give Israel sovereignty over parts of the holy city... Even so, (in 2000 there was no consensus of opinion inside Israel on the establishment of a Palestinian state)!!.. That summer, before the failure of the Camp David meetings, I saw the concern with my own eyes inside Israel; I made my first trip to the holy lands in July of that year. I met with some ministers alongside the Prime Minister, then I met Ariel Sharon, leader of the conservative Likud party, and his advisers including Tzipi Livni, and they were preparing to challenge Barak in the elections. (This meeting made clear to me that not all Israelis were willing to end the conflict on the basis of an agreement like Camp David..)

-        Ariel Sharon had been George W. Bush's guide when he visited Israel in 1998, when Bush was then Governor of Texas; Sharon had flown him by helicopter, and Bush, as he recounts, saw the fragility of the security situation in Israel... In her meeting with Sharon, Sharon showed Condi maps asserting claims to all the lands of the West Bank, Gaza, and Jerusalem, and it was clear that he would not support dividing the land and establishing a Palestinian state. The Clinton administration made frantic efforts throughout the summer and fall to reach an agreement, but the Camp David meetings failed.. The Palestinian leader insisted, up until his death, that the agreement was not good, and he informed the Clinton administration that he would be (killed) if he accepted it..

-        On 28-9-2000, Sharon was determined to visit the Al-Aqsa Mosque (the Temple Mount, as she calls it in her book), to assert Israel's sovereignty over the holy city, and the Second Intifada began, and Israel imposed a complete siege on the Palestinian territories,

-        Bush's tenure lasted eight years; we tried to revive the peace process, and our goal upon taking office was to calm the region... President Bush supports Israel's right to defend itself, but there was a rift inside the administration where the State Department saw that there should be some balance between the Israelis and the Palestinians...

-        We began to look for a different approach from this approach (which relied heavily on a radical change among the Palestinians as the key to peace.)..!! Bush did not like Arafat, while the State Department held to a more traditional view... namely that the United States must be fair and even-handed in order to achieve peace, that Israel occupies Palestinian land and builds settlements,! And the peace process should be pursued even in the face of violence, and Yasser Arafat, despite all his flaws, is the leader of the Palestinian people, and he is the key to any peace in the region...!

·       Chapter "Two-State Solution"

-        In late October -10-2001, in the first draft of the speech that President George W. Bush was to give, which had been delayed two months because of the 11-9 attacks, the word (state) was avoided in revising and editing the President's draft, and it was replaced by saying "the Palestinians should govern themselves" in line with what at that time was American policy!! When the speech was presented to President Bush, he asked with a distinctive intonation, "Does that mean they will have a state?", Dr. Condi answered.. "Yes"... but the United States always treated the question of how the Palestinians govern themselves as a final-status issue, and therefore it is subject to negotiations.. After a year in his term, the President had acquired significant experience with the issue; the President wanted to say what he meant directly.. and we agreed that he would call for the establishment of a "Palestinian state".. Then the President asked whether this state would be called "Palestine," which is a delicate subject requiring more finesse, because the Israelis always link the name "Palestine" to a deep historical meaning, and they consider using that name a prejudgment about which parts of "Judea and Samaria," which are the biblical names in the West Bank, Israel would cede, if there were anything to cede. Condi answered that it would most likely be called "Palestine," ...and I did my best to explain the somewhat circular Israeli logic on this matter. The President accepted none of this; he wanted to speak about establishing a Palestinian state and how it would live in peace and freedom alongside the state of Israel.!!

-        I phoned Mr. Danny Ayalon – the foreign policy advisor to Prime Minister Ariel Sharon at that time; I told him that the President would give a speech tomorrow, Danny, and that no U.S. President had ever called for the establishment of a Palestinian state so plainly as a matter of U.S. policy, so this statement was a departure from policy...!

-        Then I added that he would call it "Palestine," Danny objected and answered, "He cannot do that; Palestine is Judea and Samaria, and it is the biblical homeland of the Jewish people," and Danny said that he would speak with the Prime Minister, and I told him that the President had made his decision!!... Then Danny called back and asked if it was possible to call it "New Palestine."

-        The President made the establishment of a Palestinian state an objective of U.S. foreign policy. Nine days later, Colin Powell, then Secretary of State, delivered a speech at the University of Louisville reiterating the President's vision, and General Anthony Zinni was appointed Special Envoy to the Middle East...

-        This request of the President was not front-page news in the Arab press; Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia cared more about the peace process, so apparently they did not notice the President of the United States' pledge to establish a "Palestinian state," but two years later the Arabs recognized the importance of what the President had done and in that initial hesitation, they thanked the President for his stance and learned a lesson of great significance as well, namely: "Whatever one does for peace in the Middle East is not sufficient in the view of the Arab parties"...!!

-        Things later deteriorated with suicide attacks, as there were suicide operations in early December -12- 2001. In response to these operations, Israeli helicopters attacked the late Yasser Arafat's compound in Ramallah, and Sharon immediately announced that Arafat had become "out of the game"..!!

-        And Condi adds in this regard, I thought it necessary to remind the Israelis of the commitment of the Israeli prime minister, who pledged before President Bush not to kill Arafat.. then an incident occurred in the Red Sea that would have reinforced our dim view of Arafat’s leadership, I did not meet with him, nor did the President meet with him, but it was my duty to make clear that he would not lead his people toward peace...and the President put the blame on Arafat for the failure of the Camp David negotiations...and he believed that Arafat was unwilling to make the hard choices for the sake of peace...(according to what Condoleezza Rice stated in her memoirs)..

-        In January 2002, we added the "committed terrorist" to the list of crimes...Arafat had apparently renounced terrorism in 1988 and again in 1993, at the signing of Oslo, but when the Israeli navy, with continuing support from the United States, detained on 3-1-2002 the ship "Karen A" belonging to the Palestinian Authority, loaded with weapons and heading to Gaza, the matter revealed Arafat’s duplicity...(according to what Condi said)..

-        The National Security Council held a meeting a few days later to study the circumstances of this incident and to discuss its implications for U.S. policy in the Middle East, and the troubling thing was that there was a possibility that the weapons were coming from Iran, and for the Palestinian leadership, as guarantor patrons who sponsor it, we cannot tolerate or be lenient with them...we set about studying alternatives to Arafat, but we had to be careful, especially with the Israelis, in clarifying our intention to effect a peaceful change — not to assassinate Arafat-!

-        Against this background, Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia issued the 2002 peace initiative after a dinner with Thomas Friedman, the writer for The New York Times. Friedman wrote in his famous article in the paper on 17-2-2001 about the existence of this plan, and the initiative says that a united Arab world would end the conflict with Israel in exchange for the establishment of a Palestinian state based on the borders of 1967..

-        Nevertheless, as violence escalated, pressure intensified from our Arab allies and European friends to do something. The Vice President visited the Middle East in the period 12-19/3/2002, offering the possibility of meeting with Arafat if the Palestinians agreed to the full implementation of the security cooperation plan developed by George Tenet, CIA Director, and since the Palestinians did not implement Tenet’s security plan to the letter, the Vice President did not meet with Arafat. When he returned to the White House and filed his report on this trip, our discussions shifted again to the way Palestinians might find leadership that would make a two-state solution possible...and frankly we were prepared to tell the world (that this solution will not be achieved as long as Arafat remains at the head of the Authority)...!! The Israelis reoccupied the West Bank, we were not surprised and we did not criticize, but the Israelis went farther...more than necessary; they decided to besiege the Palestinian presidential compound in Ramallah with Arafat inside it...

-        On 4-4-2002, President Bush decided to deliver a speech urging Israel to stop settlement construction and halt Operation Defensive Shield.. Colin Powell traveled to the Middle East and met Arafat in the Ramallah compound while Israeli tanks were outside...and he told Arafat that he would be the last American official to meet with him if he did not curb terrorism..!! He also learned that the Israeli government had decided to build a security barrier between Israel and the West Bank.. Colin Powell returned without any agreements.. The President was saying that Israel should withdraw "without delay" but Israel interpreted it as "without delay when it ends its operations..."

-        On 25-4-2002, President Bush hosted then-Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia at his ranch in Texas, and the President’s translator said that the Saudis threatened to return to their country immediately...if the President did not work to stop the Israelis and make them withdraw that day.. The President responded in a polished manner: "Does their departure matter" !!, so I told him "It would be a catastrophe" and Colin Powell, then Secretary of State, nodded in agreement, and the President said "Go and fix it". He could not.. The President invited his Saudi guest to take a walk around the ranch and talk about religion, but that did not ease the tension with the Saudis, and their insistence was clear that the United States must deal with Israel...I called Danny, and I begged him!! to at least work to end their siege of the compound, and I told him: Arafat speaks on CNN by candlelight, and you make him look like Mother Teresa, turn on the lights for him".. Danny answered "They have electricity, and he does it to solicit sympathy"...!

-        On 2-5-2002, after five weeks since the imposition of the siege on the compound, the Israeli forces withdrew, and they allowed a smiling Yasser Arafat to emerge to be greeted by Palestinians as heroes..

-        On 10-6-2002, Sharon visited the White House.. which was almost his sixth visit to the White House, and he was told that the United States would insist that the Palestinian Authority carry out reforms before peace negotiations; there must be a new Palestinian authority, with new leadership..!!...this remark sounded pleasing to Sharon, then the President added, telling Sharon, "This does not mean that you can kill Arafat"..!! and Sharon nodded in agreement..

-        President Bush asked questions about the Palestinians, and the question that occupied his mind more than any other was why the Palestinian Authority could not find for itself suitable, acceptable leadership. He knew many Palestinians, most of whom lived in the United States and were successful in their businesses, and he did not understand (why they had not found the Palestinian Nelson Mandela...!! even under occupation..)..!!

-        The President called for elections in the Palestinian territories. We met on 21-6-2002 to conduct a final review of a draft of the President’s speech, and during the review process the Vice President spoke insistently and emphatically that the speech should not be delivered while the intifada was ongoing..!!

-        But Colin Powell expressed his fear that by delivering a speech that condemned Arafat, the United States would appear to be trying to criticize the Palestinian leadership, but the President kept saying, "He wants to speak and raise his voice in support of the Palestinians’ right to a decent life and decent governance...and he asked: Wouldn’t it be amazing if democracy in the Middle East emerged from the rocky soil of the West Bank"....

-        Then the President said he would deliver the speech...and before a crowd of journalists he said, "I call on the Palestinian people to elect new leaders, leaders who do not accept accommodation with terrorism, and I call on them to build democratic practice based on tolerance and freedom. If the Palestinians actively pursue these goals, America and the whole world will support their efforts"..."

-        After he finished the speech, we returned to the Oval Office, the President felt satisfaction and happiness for what he had done, as did I; it was a wonderful speech and different from the expected calls for negotiations between the parties, which were characterized by the tired ideas that govern policy toward the Middle East..

-        William Burns, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, said about the reactions in the Arab world that it was as if, and this means, "the gates of hell had opened", and Colin Powell could not calm the waters in the Arab world...and making matters worse was that Egyptian President Mubarak had been a guest of the President shortly before the speech was announced, and nobody had told him anything about the speech and its contents, but Mubarak felt that a betrayal had been committed against him, given the temporal proximity between his visit and the timing of the speech...the Egyptian president was concerned that some people would think he supported the controversial American call to marginalize Arafat...!! There was also a prearranged phone call with the Jewish community leadership that evening which was an occasion for flattery, when the phrases were said "We thank you, thank the President, tell him we have never heard a more important speech than his on the Middle East..." and the headlines the next day read, "Bush calls for Arafat’s removal"

-        And the President believed that by this speech he had done the right thing, "Arafat must go if we want peace in the Middle East" he agreed with him...

-        Although the Europeans believed that Arafat was very important for peace, I met with Tony Blair .............where we were meeting with the G8 summit in Canada, and Blair, in his characteristically measured manner, said "Well, George has made a stir" He said he could extend help to the President at the press conference after the meeting, and he believed that Arafat had become a spent force, and the only issue was that the Arabs and Europeans who recognize this truth well do not want to challenge the view that he is the legitimate leader of the Palestinian people...

-        And when journalists directed their question to Tony Blair, he found his way, in his wonderful manner, to support his friend, saying: "I have tried hard, as others have, to make Arafat carry out the reforms," explaining that he had met Arafat more than thirty times in recent years, "but we have reached a point where we could not make any progress and there was a situation sliding toward terrorism, and that is something that does not sit with the idea of Israel's security."

-        After he finished the speech, we retraced our steps to the Oval Office; he felt satisfaction and happiness about what he had done, and so did I. It was a great speech, different from the expected calls for negotiations between the two sides, which were characterized by the worn-out ideas that have governed policy toward the Middle East.

-        William Burns, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, on: what was the reaction? He said that the reactions in the Arab world were "horrible"...meaning that "the gates of hell have opened," and Colin Powell could not calm the waters in the Arab world...and to make matters worse, the Egyptian president, who had been a guest of President Bush at an earlier stage — specifically on 8-6-2002 — no one had told Mubarak anything about the president's upcoming speech, and of course nothing about its content, but Mubarak felt that a betrayal had been committed against him, given the temporal proximity between his visit and the speech, and he was concerned that some people might think he supported the president's controversial call to ostracize Arafat. And there was a prearranged telephone conversation with the leadership of the Jewish community that evening which was an occasion for flattery, where phrases were said: "We thank you, thank the President, tell him we have never before heard a more important speech than his regarding the Middle East..."

-        The next day the headlines ran: "Bush demands Arafat be removed"...and the President believed that with this speech he had done the right thing: "Arafat must go" if we want peace...in the Middle East — and he was agreed!.. Although the Europeans believe that Arafat is very important for peace...I met with Tony Blair at the G8 meeting in Canada; he said in his typically measured British manner, "Well, George has caused a stir," and Blair said he could lend a hand at the press conference after the meeting, and he believed that Arafat had become a spent force, and the only issue is that the Arabs and Europeans who understand this fact well do not want to challenge the view that Arafat is the legitimate Palestinian leader. When journalists asked Tony Blair, he found his way in his wonderful manner to support his friend, saying: I have tried hard, as others have, to make Arafat carry out the reforms, explaining that he had met Arafat more than thirty times in recent years, "but we have reached a point where we could not make progress, and there was a situation sliding toward terrorism and that is something that does not sit with the idea of Israel's security..." "The Arab clamor will calm down soon" and Powell succeeded in rallying support for President Bush's vision regarding a democratic Palestinian state...And at the beginning of July 2002, the foreign ministers of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt visited President Bush to discuss with him how to achieve the objectives set out in the President's speech. The Jordanian foreign minister put forward a proposal that the Jordanian king later reaffirmed during his visit to Washington the following month, which called for translating the President's speech into a written plan with specific points, based on performance; out of this proposal emerged the document "Roadmap to Peace." Blair was right in saying that the Arabs know that Arafat will not make peace, even though they do not want to admit that openly, and they were also uncomfortable with the emphasis on Palestinian democracy...It must be said that the President had broken a taboo that ought to have been broken; the Israelis loved this speech very much, but they soon realized that the President expected them to support and participate in changing the Palestinian leadership...!! And that old Israeli claim that there is no Palestinian partner for peace will also lose some of its prominence, and the United States would be able to approach the issue of Middle East peace on a radically different basis, namely the two-state solution, through which a democratic Palestinian state and a democratic State of Israel will live side by side..!!!

·       We continue writing...passages from the memoirs of Dr. Condoleezza Rice" Condoleezza Rice "Condi"

-        And Abbas began to negotiate with me immediately, saying, "I cannot tell 4 million Palestinian refugees that only 5,000 of them can return to their homes"...!

-        Tzipi Livni was the head of the Israeli negotiating delegation, and Abu Alaa was head of the Palestinian negotiating team during Ehud Olmert's term as Israeli prime minister...The Palestinian delegation was more experienced and had the benefit of 15 years of negotiations; the Palestinian negotiators know the maps and precise wording and the history of the conflict, and they know the apparent strength of their hands...whereas Tzipi Livni's team did not possess that same quality. But she said she came to speed up the negotiations..."Condi" toured the region, holding meetings with each side; progress was slow but steady and continuous, and she visited the Israeli settlement of Ariel..!

-        Olmert asked me to come to dinner with him alone, without advisers or aides. He began by declaring his confidence in Tzipi Livni, and said that the problem with Abu Alaa would not bring us to any result within the allotted time; Israel needed to reach an agreement with the Palestinians before our term ended.

-        He added, "I want to do this directly with Abu Mazen," referring to Mahmoud Abbas, "you will meet with him tomorrow, tell him that I want to appoint someone, I have someone in mind, a retired judge whom I trust, and I want Abu Mazen to appoint his own trusted representative as well. We will write the agreement in a few pages, then give it to the negotiators to put the finishing touches on." Then I began to ask about the connection between what he proposed and Tzipi Livni; I felt some awkwardness because it became clear from his words that he had not told her what he was telling me, but when I opened my mouth to say something, Olmert resumed speaking...

-        "I know what is needed; I want something on refugees and Jerusalem. I will give him enough land, maybe around 94%, with some swaps. I have an idea about Jerusalem: there will be two capitals, one for us in West Jerusalem and one for them in East Jerusalem, and the joint city council will be elected according to the percentage of the population...and that means an Israeli mayor with a Palestinian deputy, and we will continue to provide security for the holy sites because we guarantee freedom of access to them."

-        I said to myself, perhaps this proposal is unacceptable, but focus, focus...this is incredible. He continued: "I will accept some Palestinians inside Israel, maybe 5,000 people; I do not want to call that family reunification, because they have many cousins and we will not be able to control them. I was thinking about how to manage the Old City: there should be a committee of people, not officials but wise people from Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the Palestinians, Israel, and the United States...they will supervise the city, but not in a political role." And I asked myself again, "Am I really hearing this? Is the Prime Minister of Israel saying that he will divide Jerusalem and put an international body responsible for the holy sites?" ...Focus...write this...now...no, do not write; and what if it leaks? No...it cannot leak...there is only the two of us, and Olmert did not stop talking. "I will need your help on security matters; the IDF has a list of demands, some of which are reasonable, but the Palestinians will not accept them all...!"

-        "I need the United States to accomplish that in a way that satisfies the military establishment, and Barak will cooperate with you; I can market this agreement, but I cannot if the IDF says that it weakens Israel’s security, and that is something that would not allow any Israeli prime minister to remain in office. And one more thing I want to know: that you will not surprise me by raising other ideas before we have had the chance to discuss them...I am taking a huge risk here, and I cannot accept an unexpected surprise from the United States." Olmert spoke leaning forward, and none of us touched the food; when the hostess entered, he signaled her to leave immediately, and now he sat up straight, tired from recounting this long sequence of exceptional details in the agreement as he saw them.

-        And I said, "Mr. Prime Minister, that is wonderful; I will try to help. I will speak with Abu Mazen tomorrow." He said, "Be careful when you speak to him because some people may be listening to you both..!"

I hurried back to the hotel after dinner and spoke about these details only with David Walyot, and no one else... apart from that, the proposal for an international committee to oversee the holy sites, I trust my advisers, but a slip of the tongue could harm Olmert, and I told them firmly and insistently — and I knew they would not do it — do not tell anyone about this matter, then I called Steve Hadley — the U.S. National Security Adviser — telling him I had extraordinary news; nevertheless I was not comfortable even on the secure phone, and I repeated to him what I had heard from Olmert. First and foremost, I said, I am speaking from an Israeli hotel, and nobody knows who is listening, and I told him: tell the President that he was right about what he said regarding Olmert; he wants an agreement, and I do not hide that he is eager to get it...

I remembered that Yitzhak Rabin was killed after having offered much less than that, I replaced the handset and looked out the window at the Holy City and said maybe.....??

The next day I went to meet Abbas and asked to meet in the small dining room adjacent to his office. I told him the details of the proposal Olmert had made and told him the way the prime minister wanted to proceed... Abbas began negotiating with me immediately and said, 'I cannot tell 4 million Palestinian refugees that only 5,000 of them can return to their homes.' I objected, saying that he should present his concerns to the prime minister, and I asked him, 'Are you willing to speak with him?' He said yes, willing, but he will not appoint a representative he trusts... He wanted to do it personally, and I felt that the internal politics of Fatah did not permit him to bypass Abu Alaa, who is a significant force and sometimes a rival to him in the movement, and I realized this was a problem, but they are together, and we will see what happens one step at a time. I spoke with the prime minister before my departure and told him that Abbas was willing to talk, but wanted to do it personally. He said he would arrange for that meeting, and I asked him what language he would use; he said English. I told him not to forget that he speaks it better than Abbas and therefore Abbas would be in a weak position. He answered, 'It is not my intention to put him in a weak position,' and I told myself I think he meant that sincerely. Then I addressed him saying, 'I will remain in contact, Mr. Prime Minister, and I will inform the President of what transpired between us.' Olmert ended the meeting by saying, 'Remind the President of our first meeting when I said I want an agreement..!'

When I returned to Washington, I had a good idea of what we in the United States needed to do. General Will Fraser was tasked with coordinating the Roadmap; I asked him to accelerate his work. General James Jones assumed the role of special envoy, and I asked him to think about an approach to the Israel Defense Forces regarding security arrangements for the new Palestinian state. It occurred to me that some Israeli demands — for example the presence of a standing defensive force inside the Palestinian state to guard the Jordan Valley — could be handled through a regional solution: perhaps I would try to persuade the Jordanian king to place his forces alongside other forces, even NATO forces, on that border. I raised this idea with the Secretary General of the alliance and told him that he should not do anything or tell anyone about it at present. Perhaps we could convince the Israelis to accept Jordanian forces because they trust them... and Jordanians would certainly accept U.S. assistance.

As for other concerns, such as control of the airspace and border security, there might be other solutions. My view was that there would be no agreement without reliable security arrangements acceptable to Israel, and the new Palestinian state must appear in a way that would strengthen regional and Israeli security rather than diminish it.

I want to be sure that the important Arab parties are aware of what is going on, knowing that I was sure Abbas was informing them promptly. The Saudi ambassador to the United States, Adel al-Jubeir, the king’s most trusted adviser, I told Adel what I had heard from Olmert and presented some ideas regarding Jerusalem, as if they were my own ideas, in order to protect the Israeli official. He promised he would convey these ideas to the king only and no one else, and I assumed he would inform Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal, which is good, and the good thing about the Saudis is that they do not leak news.!!

Before I left the region I spoke with the King of Jordan; I did not ask him for any specific commitments because I knew he would be on our side when an agreement was imminent if it happened... The Egyptians were more complicated interlocutors because they leak news; nevertheless I was pleased to convey this news to the foreign minister and to Omar Suleiman, and it seems that President Mubarak informed his advisers that we would not succeed! and that I would fail miserably... but he did not tell me that directly. The truth is that Mubarak had not forgiven my speech in Cairo in June 2006, in which I used unprecedented language when I called for political reform in Egypt and the region. I understood that, but I needed Egypt to conclude the agreement...

The U.S. President said, 'It seems that Olmert is serious,' yet the rumor mill began to produce rumors against Olmert: investigations were underway into allegations of corruption, including accusations that he diverted political contributions for personal use, and the word 'allegations' became regularly used... We agreed that we should ignore the storm clouds gathering... and cooperate with the prime minister until we reached a point where it would be impossible to continue. I would intensify my cooperation with Abu Alaa and Tzipi Livni, and we would see if it was possible to synchronize the two negotiating tracks. When we returned to Israel in May for the sixtieth anniversary of the founding of the State of Israel, the President delivered a speech and made sure Israelis believed they had no better friend than George Bush; the speech was tinged with emotion... There should have been some lines in the President’s speech, such as an appeal to Israelis to make hard decisions — there was not even a mention of the peace process...

The speech was a missed opportunity for diplomacy; nevertheless, perhaps publicly urging Israelis to take brave action before the masses was neither correct nor appropriate, given the need to support Olmert and back him in the face of an increasing storm of legal and political trouble. The President later said that seeing Knesset members sitting next to the prime minister reminded him of sharks surrounding their prey... At the same time they look at him and at each other with suspicion; that is the situation precisely — the prime minister’s days were numbered....!!

The press — including Reuters — began asking me, in light of the consecutive visits to the region, what we were trying to accomplish... I only replied that both sides were 'serious'... referring thereby to the Annapolis conference held on 27-11-2007, which President Bush intended to make successful in advancing the peace process between the Palestinians and the Israelis after the failure of the Camp David Middle East peace summit in 2000...

There remained much to accomplish in this last year of my term, and since I could not fulfill all the promises I had made to myself to make one last tour to other parts of the world, all my focus was on the Middle East peace process where a breakthrough might be achieved....!!

Below I include the text of the speech delivered by President Mahmoud Abbas, which did not appear in Condi’s memoirs but which I copied from "Palestinian Affairs Magazine," published by the Research Center affiliated with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). (The President of the Palestinian National Authority Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) affirmed in his speech before the Annapolis conference: 'The road to peace is the only path and there is no option but it and no turning back, and negotiating for peace, and in order to achieve peace it is the right path... The exceptional major opportunity that the current Arab, Islamic and international position provides, and the overwhelming support of public opinion in both Palestinian and Israeli societies for seizing the occasion of this conference that launches the negotiation process, and not relinquishing the possibilities it brings, such an opportunity will not recur again, and if it did recur it would not find the same consensus and the same momentum... we must not squander this opportunity that may never return, let us make the peace of the brave and protect it for the sake of our children and your children').

Date 24-9-2020