The U.S. President’s Deal (Trump): Trump Vision 2020

Episode No. (9)

Security Considerations- 2- A Appendix 2

No matter what the texts of the security appendices in Trump Vision (the "Deal of the Century") tell!!:
From the moment of its creation, the State of Israel has not known a single day of peace with all its neighbors. It has fought many defensive wars, some existential in nature, as well as asymmetric battles with terrorist groups. The State of Israel remains in a state of war with two of its neighbors (Lebanon and Syria) and is exposed to extraordinary risks from rocket and projectile arsenals on its northern border. The State of Israel has repeatedly faced indiscriminate rocket fire from the Gaza Strip, and the State of Israel faces a serious threat from Iranian ballistic missiles, including missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads, and public threats from Iran to eliminate the State of Israel. And erase it from the map!!ا

Since the Six-Day War in 1967, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip have occupied a prominent place in the security of the State of Israel, largely due to strategic geographic considerations. Looking at the West Bank alone, the area borders Israel’s coastal plain, where 70% of the population of the State of Israel is concentrated with about 80% of its industrial capacity.

Before 1967, Israel’s coastal plain was only 9 miles wide at its narrowest point. While Israel’s coastal plain lies at sea level, the West Bank contains a series of hills running north to south that rise to 3,118 feet at their highest point. This means the Jordan Valley provides a sharp physical barrier of roughly 600 meters in elevation against any external attack from the east. Forces deployed along the eastern slopes of the West Bank hills could topographically control the most sensitive parts of Israel’s national infrastructure against a numerically superior army until Israel completes the mobilization of its reserves, which may take 48 hours. Israel currently has no security concern with the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, with which it concluded a peace treaty in 1994, but it does with other Middle Eastern states that might seek to use Jordanian territory by force as a platform for attacks against the State of Israel.

The security portion of this Vision was developed based on our best understanding of the security requirements of the State of Israel, as presented by successive Israeli governments to the United States.

·       Security needs of the State of Israel

·       Jordan Valley

-        The Jordan River sits approximately 1,300 feet below sea level, but it is adjacent to a series of hills running north to south that reach 3,118 feet at their highest point. This means the Jordan Valley provides a sharp physical barrier of roughly 600 meters in elevation against any external attack from the east. Forces deployed along the eastern slopes of the West Bank hill range can prevent a numerically superior army until Israel completes reserve mobilization, which may take 48 hours. Israel currently has no security concern with the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, with which it concluded a peace treaty in 1994, but it does with other Middle Eastern countries that might seek to use Jordanian land by force as a platform for attack against the State of Israel.

-        The Jordan Valley is not only important with respect to conventional attacks against the State of Israel, but also with respect to terrorism. After its unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, the State of Israel learned the consequences of losing control of the external perimeter of disputed territory!! in a counterinsurgency war. Gaza became a safe haven not only for Hamas, but also for international jihadist groups such as the Islamic Jihad in Palestine that undermined Egypt’s security in Sinai. If these groups infiltrated the West Bank, they could create a chaotic security situation for the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan as well as for the State of Israel...!!If the State of Israel were to withdraw from the Jordan Valley, there would be significant implications for regional security in the Middle East.

·       Secure supply lines to the Jordan Valley

-        Israel must ensure secure lines of supply for its forces in the Jordan Valley and the ability to move its military personnel and materiel to and from the area.

·       Main Ben Gurion Airport

-        Israel’s main international Ben Gurion Airport is 5.9 miles from the pre-1967 line. Among the threats to the airport’s security today are anti-aircraft rockets used by terrorist organizations. Known as man-portable air-defense systems or MANPADS, these systems are widespread throughout the Middle East. Special security standards for airport defense are necessary to prevent threats to Ben Gurion Airport and nearby air traffic.

·       Israeli control of the airspace west of the Jordan River

-        Because of its narrow breadth, Israel lacks the time and space that many other countries have to respond to rapidly approaching threats, particularly airborne threats. The distance from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea is about 40 miles. A modern fighter jet can cover that distance in less than three minutes. It takes the Israeli Air Force about three minutes to re-task fighters. If Israel does not retain control of the West Bank’s airspace, it will not have sufficient time to defend against incoming hostile aircraft or missiles. For this reason, in any peace arrangement, the State of Israel must have operational control of the airspace west of the Jordan River.

·       The problem of international forces

-        The State of Israel has witnessed the failure of international forces in Sinai (pre-1967) and in Lebanon, Gaza, and the Golan. Given its experience, Israel’s primary security doctrine—that it must be able to defend itself—remains as prominent as ever. It is in the United States’ vital strategic interest that the State of Israel remain strong and secure, be protected by the Israel Defense Forces, and continue to maintain stability in the region.

·       Iran

-        In recent years, Iran has become a consequential actor in parts of the Middle East that could affect Israeli security. Iran’s strategy seeks to encircle Israel, using Lebanon, Syria, and Gaza, and to contain Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Bahrain, and Yemen. Iran hopes to establish a "land bridge" extending from the Iranian-Iraqi border to the Mediterranean Sea. Iran’s entire activity must be taken into account when determining the security needs of the State of Israel.

·       Security Appendix 2-B

·       Security standards

-        The specified security standards include the following: • The counterterrorism system in the State of Palestine must include all elements of counterterrorism, from the initial detection of illicit activity, to long-term imprisonment of perpetrators. The system should include: intelligence officers to detect any potential terrorist activity, counterterrorism units specially trained for site raids and arrests of perpetrators, forensic experts to exploit the site and pretrial detention officers to ensure detainees are held, prosecutors and judges to issue orders for conducting trials, and post-conviction detention officers to ensure prisoners serve their sentences. The system should include stand-alone detention facilities and personnel who have been vetted.

-        The State of Palestine will establish a clear legal system that confronts and sustains the fight against terrorism, including by:

-        Enacting and enforcing laws that prohibit all terrorist activities and terrorist organizations, and that prohibit all incitement to terrorism, as well as the financing of such activity and organizations.

-        Prosecuting those involved directly or indirectly in terrorist activity and sentencing them appropriately;

-         Ending all payments that reward terrorism, directly or indirectly, to those involved in terrorist activity or to their families.

-        The breadth and depth of counterterrorism activities in the State of Palestine will be determined by:

1-    The extent of arresting and intercepting suspects, perpetrators, and accomplices;

2-    The methodical and comprehensive nature of investigations and interrogations to root out all terrorist networks and infrastructure;

3-    Charging regulations and the extent of penalties;

4-    The methodical and comprehensive nature of efforts to prohibit, seize weapons and explosives, and prevent the manufacture of weapons and explosives;

5-    The success of efforts to prevent infiltration of terrorists and terrorist organizations into the security forces of the State of Palestine.

-        During negotiations, the parties will, in consultation with the United States, attempt to establish preliminary metrics regarding the security standards acceptable to the State of Israel, and in any case no less stringent than the standards used by either the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan or the Arab Republic of Egypt, in which case (whichever is more stringent) will be used with respect to security standards. Given the evolution of security threats, the metrics are intended as guidance. However, the establishment of such metrics will allow the State of Palestine to better understand the minimum objectives expected of it and to consider the regional minimum standards.

·       Security Appendix 2C

· Removal Standards and Other Security Arrangements

- In addition to the predominant security responsibility of the State of Palestine, the State of Israel will be responsible for security at all international crossings to the State of Palestine. With respect to the Rafah crossing, specific arrangements will be agreed between the Republic of Egypt and the State of Israel to accomplish the security requirements set forth in this Vision.

- The State of Israel will continue its control of the airspace and the electromagnetic spectrum west of the Jordan River. During the negotiation period, the parties shall negotiate in good faith on related financial matters.
The Israeli Navy will have the right to prevent weapons and materials prohibited by weapons manufacturing from entering the State of Palestine, including Gaza

- The State of Palestine will not have the right to conclude military, intelligence, or security agreements with any state or organization that adversely affects the State of Israel, as determined by the State of Israel.

- The State of Palestine will not be able to develop military or paramilitary capabilities inside or outside the State of Palestine. A demilitarized State of Palestine is prohibited from possessing capabilities that could threaten the State of Israel including: weapons systems such as combat aircraft (manned and unmanned); heavy armored vehicles. Mines. Missiles. Missiles. Heavy machine guns laser/radiation weapons; anti-aircraft. Anti-armor. Anti-ship. Military intelligence; offensive cyber and electronic warfare capabilities; production facilities and procurement mechanisms for weapons systems; military infrastructure and training facilities; or any weapons of mass destruction

- Any expansion of Palestinian security capabilities beyond the capabilities existing on the date of issuance of this Vision is subject to an agreement with the State of Israel

- The State of Israel reserves the right to dismantle and destroy any facility in the State of Palestine used to produce prohibited weapons or for other hostile purposes. While the State of Israel will make its best efforts to minimize incursions into the State of Palestine, the State of Israel will retain the right to participate in the security measures necessary to ensure that the State of Palestine remains demilitarized and not a threat to the State of Israel, including from terrorist threats.

- Thursday, 6-2-2020